Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players'cost of e¤ort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of e¤ort, d. We show that the Arrow-Pratt curvature of d; R d ; determines the e¤ect on equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s of the increased ‡exibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If R d is increasing and the value (cost of e¤ort) is independent of the state, then the equilibrium expected e¤ort increases (decreases) with the level of information. Moreover, if R d is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is non-negative (non-positive).
Introduction
We study how changes in the information available to the players of a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information a¤ect their equilibrium payo¤s and their incentives to exert e¤ort. In a Tullock contest a player's probability of winning the prize is the ratio of the e¤ort he exerts and the total e¤ort exerted by all players -see Tullock (1980) . In a symmetric common-value contest with incomplete information players have a common state dependent value for the prize and a common state dependent cost of e¤ort, and all players have the same information.
There are a variety of economic settings (rent-seeking, innovation tournaments, patent races) in which agents face a game strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest -see Baye and Hoppe (2003) . Tullock contests may also arise by design, e.g., in sport competition or internal labor markets -see Konrad (2008) for a general survey.
Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) provide alternative axiomatizations of Tullock contests.
In our setting, players'uncertainty about their common value and common cost is described by a probability space, and players'information is described by a sub…eld of the …eld on which players'common prior is de…ned. In this model, changes in the level of information are conveniently represented as changes in the sub…eld describing the players'information. 1 We begin by showing that every contest in which players'cost of e¤ort is a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex function in every state has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. Einy et al. (2013) have recently established a general existence theorem for Tullock contests with incomplete information when the probability space describing players' information is …nite, and have provided conditions 1 When players' uncertainty can be represented as a partition, our model is equivalent to Harsanyi's model -see Jackson (1993) and Vohra (1999) . Representing players' uncertainty as a -sub…eld allows us to capture situations in which, for example, players' value and/or cost are continuous random variables and their information comes from observing a continuous signal. In the setting considered by Wasser (2013) , for which we derive results in Proposition 5.2, players are uncertain about their constant marginal cost of e¤ort, which is the realization of a continuous random variable. If players observe a noisy public signal of their marginal cost, then we may not be able to represent their information as a partition.
for uniqueness of equilibrium -see also Ewerhart and Quartieri (2013) on the issue of uniqueness of equilibrium. These results do not apply to our setting, in which the probability space may be in…nite and the players' information is described by asub…eld of subsets of the state space. Moreover, we show that the unique equilibrium is symmetric and interior, which are properties that greatly simplify our analysis. 2 There is a well known formal equivalence between Tullock contests and the Cournot model. This equivalence allows us to use some auxiliary results obtained by Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2003) , EMS (2003) henceforth, who study the value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike EMS (2003), however, we do not assume that the cost function is linear, but allow instead for any convex function. Also, our results apply to generalized Tullock contest, for which a player's probability of wining the prize is the ratio between her score and the sum of the scores of all the players, and the score is any twice di¤erentiable, increasing and concave function of e¤ort. In contrast, EMS (2003) assumes that the demand function, whose role in the Cournot model is akin to that of the contest success function in a Tullock contest, is log concave. Also unlike EMS (2003), we allow for any …nite number of players instead of just two, and we derive results about the impact of information on players' equilibrium expected e¤orts as well as on their payo¤s -EMS (2003) is concerned exclusively with the value of public information.
For the class of contests in which equilibrium is unique and symmetric, the question "how changes in the level of information available to the players a¤ects their equilibrium expected payo¤s and e¤orts" is well posed. We are able to provide an answer to this question when the players'cost of e¤ort is a multiplicative function, that is, when it is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real-valued 2 We show along lines of the proof of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997)'s Theorem 1 that the complete information game de…ned by the realized state of nature has a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric and interior. (We establish existence whenever the cost function is convex, rather than strictly convex, which allows as to deal with the linear case.) Then we construct an equilibrium of the Bayesian game of incomplete information associated to the contest appealing to the argument of of random variables (v; w) describing, respectively, the players' common value and common cost, which are the uncertain elements of the contest, we de…ne a binary relation that ranks information sub…elds according to the level of information they contain: a sub…eld H is more informative than some other sub…eld G if the predictions of the value and cost are the same whether players'information is given by H or by the aggregate information in H and G.
More information allows the contest's participants more ‡exibility when choosing how much e¤ort they want to exert, but reduces their ability to commit to exert a low e¤ort when, e.g., the value of the prize is high. We de…ne two auxiliary realvalue functions, E and U , which provide the equilibrium expected e¤ort and payo¤, respectively, in a contest in which v and w are positive constant random variables and players have full information (i.e., their information …eld is the …eld on which the common prior is de…ned). It turns put that when E (respectively, U ) is either concave or convex the e¤ect on equilibrium expected e¤ort (payo¤) of the increased ‡exibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest is clear-cut: if E is convex (concave), then the players' expected e¤ort increases (decreases) with the level of information. Likewise, if U is convex (concave), then the players'expected payo¤ increases (decreases) with the level of information, i.e., the value of public information is non-negative (non-positive). Moreover, the conditions leading to either of these functions been either concave or convex are related to the Arrow-Pratt curvature of the function d; the deterministic component of the cost function. 3 Using our results relating the curvature of the auxiliary functions E and U to the e¤ect of changes of information on equilibrium expected e¤orts and payo¤s, we show that if the Arrow-Pratt curvature of d is increasing, then the equilibrium expected e¤ort decreases with the level of information in contests in which the cost of e¤ort is independent of the state of nature, and increases with the level of information in contests in which the value is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if ArrowPratt curvature of d is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is 3 In expected utility theory the Arrow-Pratt curvature is a measure of relative risk aversion. The impact of public information on the equilibrium expected payo¤s and e¤orts in Tullock contests has been seldom studied in the literature. For two-player generalized Tullock contests, in which the prize is allocated using some score function g; and e¤orts are monetary (i.e., the cost of e¤ort is independent of the state of nature and d is the identity), Warneryd (2003) studies the equilibrium expected e¤orts for two polar information structures: when players'information about the value is just their common prior, and when they observe the value. Warneryd (2003) …nds that whether the equilibrium expected e¤ort is greater or less for one or the other information structure depends on whether the ratio g=g 0 is a concave or convex function. This result is easily derived in our setting, and extended to contests with any number of players and arbitrary information structures. Moreover, we are able to evaluate as well the impact of changes in the level of information on the equilibrium payo¤s -see
Wasser (2003) studies Tullock contests in which the players' constant marginal cost of e¤ort is uncertain -see also Myerson and Warneryd (2006) . For symmetric contests, Wasser (2003) shows that when players' information about the common marginal cost is just their prior information they exert less e¤ort than when they observe the marginal cost (Proposition 3). We show that this conclusion, which is an implication of our results, extends to any two comparable information structures.
Moreover, we show that in these contests the value of public information is zero,
i.e., equilibrium payo¤s are invariant to changes in the level of information -see 
Symmetric Common-Value Tullock Contests
In a Tullock contest, a group of players N = f1; :::; ng; with n 2; compete for a prize by choosing a level of e¤ort in R + . Given a pro…le of players' e¤orts x 2 R n + nf0g the prize is allocated to player i 2 N with probability i (x) = x i = x; where x P N j=1 x j ; whereas if x = 0, i.e., if players exert no e¤ort, then the prize is allocated using some predetermined probability vector (0) 2 n . We assume that players are uncertain about their common value for the prize and their common cost function.
This uncertainty is described by a probability space ( ; F; p); where is the set of states of nature, F is a -…eld of subsets of ; and p is -additive probability measure on F. We interpret p as the players'common prior belief about the realized state of nature. The players'value of the prize is described by an integrable function v : ! R ++ : The player's cost function is described by a function c :
The players' information about the state of nature is described by a -sub…eld of F, which we denote by G, specifying the event observed by players following each realization of the state of nature.
We therefore identify a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information with a collection T = (N; ( ; F; p); v; c; G). Also, if X is an integrable random variable on ( ; F; p); and G is a -sub…eld of F, we write E[X j G] for the conditional expectation of X with respect to G.
A symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information T = (N; ( ; F; p); v; c; G) de…nes a Bayesian game G(T ) in which the set of actions of each player is R + , and the payo¤ function of each player i 2 N is u i : R n + ! R given for every ! 2 and x 2 R n + by
In this game a pure strategy of player i 2 N is an integrable G-measurable function s i : ! R + specifying player i's e¤ort in each state of nature. (The requirement that a player's strategy be G-measurable captures the restrictions imposed by the player's information on the events on which she may condition her actions.) We denote by S the set of all pure strategies of a player. Given a strategy pro…le s = (s 1 ; :::; s n ) 2 S n ;
we denote by s i the pro…le obtained from s by suppressing the strategy of player i 2 N: A pro…le of strategies s = (s 1 ; :::; s n ) 2 S n is an Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a symmetric common-value Tullock contest T if it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G(T ); i.e., if for every i 2 N; every s i 2 S; and almost all ! 2 ;
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria.
Our …rst result establishes conditions implying that a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information has a unique (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and that this equilibrium symmetric.
Theorem 2.1. A symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players' cost function c(!; ) is twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, convex, and satis…es c(!; 0) = 0 for all ! 2 has a unique (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium, s . Moreover, s is symmetric and interior, i.e.,
Proof: For every ! 2 de…ne the n-person complete information game G(!; T ) in which the set of pure strategies of every player is R + and the payo¤ function of each
The game G(!; T ) has a unique Nash equilibrium t (!) = (t 1 (!); :::; t n (!)), which is symmetric and interior, i.e., t 1 (!) = t 2 (!) = ::: = t n (!) for all ! 2 the pro…le t (!) 2 R n + is the unique Nash equilibrium of G(!; T ), and t 1 (!) = t 2 (!) = ::: = t n (!).
Note that the description of a Tullock contests T = (N; ( ; F; p); v; c; G) omits any reference to the probability distribution (0) used to allocate the prize when players exert no e¤ort. As we show in the Appendix, under our assumptions the unique Nash equilibrium of the game G(!; T ) is independent of this probability distribution.
Hence the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of T is independent of (0): In order to study the e¤ect of information on equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s,
we restrict attention to the class of symmetric common-value Tullock contests with incomplete information in which the players'cost function is such that for all (!; x) 2
where w is a non-negative integrable random variable, i.e., w 2 L 
( ; F; p); and let G and H be any two -sub…elds of F. We say that H is weakly more informative than G, and we write H % G, if
E(v j H) = E(v j G _ H) and E(w j H) = E(w j G _ H);
where G _ H is the smallest -sub…eld of F that contains both G and H. That is, H is weakly more informative than G if the predictions of the common value and the cost function (the uncertain elements of the contest) are the same whether players information is given by H or it is given by the aggregate information in G and H.
For any -sub…eld of F, G, we denote by s G and u G the equilibrium strategy and payo¤, respectively, of every player in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the contest T = (N; ( ; F; p); v; wd; G) 2 T (d) (which is unique and symmetric by Theorem 2.1).
We say that the value of public information in T 2 T (d) is positive (negative) if for every contest (N; ( ; F; p); v; wd; H) 2 T (d),
Also, we say that the equilibrium expected e¤ort increases (decreases) with the level of information in T 2 T (d) if for every contest (N; ( ; F; p); v; wd; H) 2 T (d),
Information and E¤ort
We study the e¤ect of changes in the level of information on the equilibrium expected e¤ort. For each (a; b) 2 R 
for the equilibrium expected e¤ort. Proposition 3.1 establishes an auxiliary result relating the e¤ect of information on the equilibrium expected e¤ort to the curvature of the function E (speci…cally, whether it is convex or concave). We omit the proof of this proposition since it is identical to that of Proposition 3.3 in EMS (2003). 
for all ! 2 , the …rst order condition Proof. We prove Proposition 3.2.1. Di¤erentiating equation (3) with respect to a we get
Hence
i.e., the equilibrium e¤ort increases with the players'common value of the prize, a.
Di¤erentiating this expression we get
W.l.o.g. assume that w( ) = 1 on . Since s a (a; 1) > 0 by (4), then equation (5) implies s aa (a; 1) S 0 , (sd 0 (s)) 00 (a; 1) T 0:
Hence:
and (sd 0 (s)) 00 (a; 1) 0 ) E 00 (a) = E(s aa (a; 1)) 0:
Therefore the conclusion of Proposition 3.2.1 follows from Proposition 3.1.
We prove Proposition 3.2.2. Di¤erentiating (3) with respect to b we get
i.e., the equilibrium e¤ort decreases with b (hence with the cost of e¤ort). Di¤eren-tiating this expression with respect to b again yields
W.l.o.g. assume that v( ) = 1 on . Since s b (1; b) < 0 as shown in (6), then
where the …rst implication follows from equation (7). Thus, the equilibrium expected e¤ort increases with the level of information in T by Proposition 3.1.
For any twice di¤erentiable strictly increasing function d : R + ! R + , the ArrowPratt curvature of d is given for x 2 R + by
In expected utility theory, R d is interpreted as a measure of relative risk aversion for an individual with preferences represented by a concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function d. In our setting, however, d is the deterministic component of the players' cost, and is assumed to be convex (rather than concave) to assure that an equilibrium exist (by Theorem 2.1). Also, the players' utility function is state- Proof. For all x 2 R + ;
and therefore by Proposition 3.2.1 the equilibrium expected e¤ort decreases with the level of information in T whenever w is constant on .
Assume that v is constant on , and w.l.o.g. set v( ) = 1: Taking log in equation 
Hence s b (1; b) < 0: Di¤erentiating with respect to b again yields
If R d is increasing, then the second term in the right hand side is non-positive, and therefore the …rst term is positive, i.e.,
HenceÊ
and thus by Proposition 3.1 the equilibrium expected e¤ort increases with the level of information in T .
The Value of Public Information
In this section we study the value of public information. For each (a; b) 2 R 2 ++ we write U (a; b) for the expected equilibrium payo¤ in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the contest (N; ( ; F; p); a1 ; (b1 ) d; F). Since in equilibrium all players win the price with the same probability -see equation (2) -then
Let 2 R ++ : Since the payo¤ function of a player in the Bayesian game associated with the contest (N; ( ; F; p); a1 ;
then s( a; b) = s(a; b) and U ( a; b) = U (a; b); i.e., s is homogeneous of degree zero and U is homogeneous of degree one on R 2 ++ : Proposition 4.1 establishes an auxiliary result relating the curvature of the function U to the sign of the value of information. This result on the value of public information is the counterpart of Proposition 3.1. Its proof is also omitted. Using (8) we may write U (a; b) = a n bE(k(a; b)):
Since U is homogeneous of degree one, then U is convex (concave) if and only if U aa (a; b) 0 (U aa (a; b) 0) -see Lemma A.2 in the Appendix. Di¤erentiating (9) we get
We show below that
which completes the proof by Proposition 4.1.
Di¤erentiating k we get
Di¤erentiating again and using equation (5) we get
5 Applications and Examples 6 Appendix Lemma A.1. A symmetric common-value Tullock contest with complete information in which the players' cost of e¤ort is a twice di¤erentiable strictly increasing, and convex function c : R + ! R + such that c(0) = 0 has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is symmetric and interior.
Proof. In the complete information game associated with a symmetric commonvalue Tullock contest with complete information the set of pure strategies of every player is R + and the payo¤ function of each player i 2 N is h i : R n + ! R + given for
where v > 0 is the players'common value and x = P n j=1 x j , and If '(0) = x (v x c 0 (0)) 0; then @h i (x i ; x i )=@x i 0 on R + for all i; and therefore x = 0; which is a contradiction. Hence '(0) > 0; and therefore x i > 0 and '(x i ) = 0 for all i 2 N; which implies that x i = x j for all i; j 2 N , i.e., x is symmetric and interior.
Thus, x = (t ; :::; t ); where t > 0 solves the equation Proof. By Euler's Theorem f (x; y) = xf x (x; y) + yf y (x; y):
Di¤erentiating with respect to x on both sides on this equation and simplifying yields xf xx (x; y) + yf yx (x; y) = 0:
Likewise xf xy (x; y) + yf yy (x; y) = 0:
Hence x 2 f xx (x; y) = y 2 f yy (x; y);
and therefore f xx (x; y) S 0 , f yy (x; y) S 0:
Further, (10) and (11) imply f xx (x; y)f yy (x; y) f xy (x; y)f yx (x; y) = 0:
Thus, the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix of f are non-negative (non-positive) when f xx is a non-negative (non-positive) function on R 2 :
